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ABSTRACT The rapid development of mobile internet technology and the better availability of GPS
have made mobile online social networks (mOSNs) more popular than traditional online social networks
(OSNs) over the last few years. They necessitate fundamental social operations such as establishing friend
relationship, location sharing among friends, and providing location-based services. As a consequence,
security and privacy issues demands the utmost importance to mOSNs users. The first stream of existing
solutions adopts two different servers to store locations-based and social network-based information
separately, thereby sustaining large storage and communication overhead. The second stream of solutions
aims at integrating the social network server and the location-based server into a single entity. However, as
these approaches exploit only one single server, they may face several performance issues related to server
bottlenecks. Moreover, such schemes are found to be vulnerable to various active and passive security
attacks. In this paper, we propose a privacy preserving, secure and efficient location sharing scheme for
mOSNs, which shows both efficiency and flexibility in the location update, sharing, and query of social
friends and social strangers. The security of the proposed scheme is validated using random oracle based
formal security proof and Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic based authentication proof, followed by
informal security analysis. Additionally, we have used ProVerif 1.93 to verify the security of the system. The
efficiency and practicability of the proposed scheme are demonstrated through experimental implementation
and evaluation.
INDEX TERMS Mobile online social networks, Privacy, Location sharing and query, BAN logic, Random
oracle.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advancement of mobile internet technology over the
last few years have shifted online social networks (OSNs)
users towards its more flexible and dynamic version, namely
mobile online social network (mOSNs). In general, mobile
users keep their mobile devices in online mode anytime,
anywhere. This allows the mobile device to use the current
location information, thereby providing support to a range
of location-based services such as current location sharing,
social friend or stranger’s location query, etc. Nowadays,
mOSNs users can use location-based services to recommend
good social friend, search various intended Points of Interests
(PoIs) such as restaurants, movie halls and hospitals.
Online Social Networks (OSN) is an online platform
which people use to build social networks or social relation-
ships with other people who share similar personal or career
interests and activities [1]. Normally, people use PC or laptop
to use and access online social network services.
Mobile online social networking (mOSN) involves the
interactions between participants with similar interests and
objectives through their mobile devices and/or tablet within
virtual social networks [1]. mOSN leverages mobile com-
munication networks and social networks, as mobile appli-
cations can use existing social networks. In mOSN, social
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networks can take advantage of mobile features and ubiqui-
tous accessibility. Moreover, an mOSN can readily exploit
mobile networks to support the concept of real-time web [2],
which is at the forefront of the emerging trends in social
networking. mOSNs enhance conventional social networks
with additional features, such as location-awareness, tag me-
dia [3], etc.
mOSNs can take advantage of the additional capabilities
of modern mobile devices such as smartphones or tablets.
People can access mOSNs applications anywhere and any-
time. These capabilities, such as global position system
(GPS) receiver, sensing modules (cameras, sensors, etc.),
and multiple radios (third/fourth generation cellular, WiFi,
Bluetooth, WiFi Direct, etc.), enable mOSNs to enhance
conventional social networks with additional features, such
as location-awareness [5], location-based service, the ability
to capture and tag media [3]. In general built-in GPS is not
that much available in laptops. Moreover, it does not exploit
4G or the current standard of cellular networks. Hence,
location-based services cannot be accessed using laptops [1].
Location sharing through mOSN may end up in catas-
trophic failure, especially when privacy and security mea-
sures are not implemented properly. On the one hand, the
popularity and usage of mOSN based applications are in-
creasing every day. On the other hand, different malicious
users and attackers continuously engineer innovative attacks
to unlawfully access and modify various social and physi-
cal information of the registered mOSN users. The imple-
mentation of a secured, privacy-preserving location sharing
strategy while sustaining the modern-day facilities of various
mOSN applications is a serious research challenge.
Detail security analysis reveals the vulnerability of the
existing related schemes against many security attacks, such
as the denial-of-service (DoS) attack [6], replay attack [6], [7]
and privileged insider attack [6], [7]. A recent study reveals
that two attacking tricks, namely Regional Statistical Attack
(RSA) [8] and Long-term Statistical Attack (LSA) [8], give
more opportunity to the attackers.
In this paper, we propose a new location sharing scheme
for mobile online social network applications, in which the
limitations of the earlier schemes concerning security and
functionality are overcome. The proposed system adopts
a model, where the social network server (SNS) and the
location-based server (LBS) are integrated into one single
entity. To share privacy-preserving locations, the proposed
scheme exploits dummy locations, a dedicated mapping pro-
tocol among the Cellular Tower (CT) and a set of location-
storing social network servers. Various security attacks in-
cluding the strong replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack,
etc., which are prevalent in existing schemes, can be success-
fully overcome by our scheme.
Formal security validation of the proposed scheme is
achieved through ProVerif 1.93 simulation tool. The Real-
or-Random (ROR) model based on the random oracle model
is employed to verify the security of the proposed scheme
formally. Moreover, BAN logic is used to prove authentica-
tion of the proposed system. We logically explain how the
proposed scheme defends various active and passive security
attacks by analyzing it informally. Experimental implemen-
tation and evaluation results demonstrate the efficiency and
practicality of the proposed scheme.
Our study shows that although modern smartphones have
privacy and security-based location sharing features, those
services requires improvements in the security aspects. More-
over, in current systems, location sharing to a large number
of friends may incur substantial security hazards.
First, although popular online social networks provide
many facilities to social life, they also increase the danger
of user privacy breaches due to direct and indirect location
sharing. A few studies have attempted to address the location
privacy issues in MSNs [9], [10], [11]. Recently, H. Li
et. al presented an empirical research to quantify private
information leaking issues arising from location sharing in
popular OSNs such as Facebook and Twitter [12]. They
conducted a three-week real-world experiment with 30 par-
ticipants, and discovered that direct and indirect location
sharing by popular OSNs could reveal 16% and 33% of the
users’ real points of interest (POIs) respectively. External
adversary was able to attack to infer the demographics (e.g.,
age, gender, education) after observing the exposed users’
location profiles. H. Li et. al implemented such an attack
in a large real-world dataset involving 22,843 mobile users
[12]. Many popular social networks provide location-based
sharing functionalities like geolocation tags and check-in
services. Based on these functionalities, the attacker can
easily obtain the location information shared by the mobile
users by crawling the interested information from web pages
and extracting POIs from the collected data [10], [13].
Second, It is possible for a privileged insider to execute
location spoofing intentionally, providing fake locations on
the location-based features of Facebook, WhatsApp and
Snapchat (e.g. Nearby Friends and Snap Map). This is done
using downloadable apps like FakeGPS, in order to deceive
the social friends for malicious purpose [14].
Third, sharing location information is less safe especially
when a person has large number of friends or followers whom
he/she might not actually know. Location sharing and friend’s
location query should be done on a restricted basis where
the communicating parties can limit the distance threshold
by which they can find each other.
In this paper, we address above security drawbacks of the
existing location-based features by popular OSNs. According
to our proposed scheme, MUi and LSSNS first separately
establish a shared symmetric session key with CT . All
location updates and friend’s location query messages are
encrypted with this session key before transmission. Because
of this end-to-end encryption, an adversary A has little
chance to reveal the location information of MUi. Further-
more, unlike the location-based services of existing OSNs,
our proposed scheme allows a user to decide a distance
threshold, up to which he/she wants to make himself/herself
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visible to the social friends. This imposes a much better
user controlled restriction on location sharing, as unrestricted
location sharing can lead to security vulnerabilities.
A. MOTIVATION
The factors that motivated us to envisage the proposed
scheme explained in this paper are as follows.
1) In order to achieve efficiency, the communication cost
between the social network server (SNS) and the
location-based server (LBS) should be as little as pos-
sible. Moreover, less message exchange would give an
attacker less exposure to execute attacks in a wireless
public channel.
2) The Location sharing mechanism should not depend
on a third-party location-based server. This should be
done to minimize the chance of privacy leakage and to
minimize the establishment cost.
3) The location-based server (LBS) must not be able to
discover the topological structures of users’ social net-
work. By collusion with the social network server, LBS
should not be able to reveal users’ social information.
B. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
The following contributions are made in this paper:
1) The location sharing scheme of the proposed scheme
does not depend on any third-party location-based
server. This eliminates the possibility of LBS to reveal
the social network topology structure of a social user.
2) The proposed scheme integrates LBS and SNS into
a set of single entity servers, thereby reducing their
internal communication overhead.
3) The proposed scheme has the ability to resist various
active and passive security attacks which are present in
the existing schemes.
4) The location sharing mechanism is efficient, lightweight
and secure. We avoid computation costly operations
like bilinear pairing, elliptic curve cryptography, public
key infrastructure (PKI), public key cryptography.
5) On top of informal security analysis, we validate se-
curity of the proposed scheme through formal security
verification using random oracle, and through security
simulation using ProVerif 1.93.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section II outlines the
existing work in brief. Section III discusses mathematical
preliminaries, which are necessary to set up the proposed
scheme. The system architecture and threat model is ex-
plained in Section IV. Section V presents the proposed loca-
tion sharing scheme for multiserver architecture in mOSNs.
Section VI provides various formal security proofs along
with informal security analysis. Section VII presents security
validation using ProVerif 1.93 simulation tool. Section VIII
presents the computation and communication cost of the
proposed scheme. Section IX presents a performance and
security comparison of the proposed scheme with the other
related existing schemes. Finally, Section X concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In the field of mOSNs, privacy and security issues have
attracted a great deal of research focus. Hence, in recent
years, many of privacy-preserving schemes have been pro-
posed with their own merits and limitations. Earlier research
focuses on privacy preserving schemes aimed at the achieve-
ment of at achievement of information privacy [15], user
anonymity [16] and protection of location privacy [17].
In order to sustain location anonymity, a mobile device
encrypts the current location before sending it to servers. K-
anonymity for location privacy adopts the process of obfus-
cating the actual location of the user as proposed and used
by [18] and [19]. The use of dummy location along with the
real location is the next approach for location anonymity [20].
Location encryption is another very effective way to achieve
location privacy protection [21]. The pseudonym methods
[22], [23], mix zones [24] and the m-unobservability [25]
are some well know schemes developed in the past. Rahman
et al. obtained location obscurity through privacy context
obfuscation based on various location parameters [26].
Location sharing while maintaining privacy protection in
online social networks has been first primarily addressed in
2007 by SmokeScreen [27], which allowed sharing locations
between social friends and strangers. Wei et al. enhanced
this scheme and proposed Mobishare, where users’ social
and location information were separately stored into SNS
and LBS respectively [28]. Mobishare suffers from the weak-
ness that, in the query phrase, LBS can reveal the topology
structure of social networks of a user. Recently, Li et al.
[29] enhanced Mobishare to propose new privacy-protected
location-sharing scheme in mOSNs, namely MobiShare+,
which introduced the concept of dummy queries and private
set intersection to prevent LBS from knowing social infor-
mation of a user. BMobiShare is a improved version over
MobiShare+ in terms of transmission efficiency, where the
existing private set intersection method is replaced by Bloom
Filter [30]. However, the computation cost of BMobiShare is
quite high.
In 2015, in order to improve privacy-protection against
the insider attack, Li et al. introduced a multiple location
server based location sharing system [31]. Although it pro-
vides higher security, it is resource-demanding and time-
inefficient. As these schemes rely on the third-party location
server, they associate the chance of LBS to collude with SNS
in order to reveal the social information. Also, they incur
a high transmission and storage cost [28], [32], [33], [29],
[30]. To address this issue, very recently, Xiao et al. proposed
CenLocShare [34], where SNS and LBS were amalgamated
into one single server. This scheme reduces communication
cost, storage cost and also increases user’s privacy protection.
Remark 1. The implementation of end-to-end encryption is
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TABLE 1: Symbols and notations used in the proposed scheme.
Symbol Description Symbol Description
MUi i
th mOSN user IDi The identity of the ith user
CT Cellular Tower IDCT The identity of the CT
LSSNSj j
th Location Sharing Social Network Server IDSj The identity of the LSSNSj
PWi The login password of MUi PWSj The login password of LSSNSj
Bi User biometric of MUi MPWBi Biometric embedded password of MUi
TIDi Temporary identity of MUi RIDi The pseudo-identity of MUi
RIDΓ The pseudo-identity of CT Ωui 128-bits Random Variable
RNui 128-bit random number chosen by MUi RNct 128-bit random number chosen by CT
XΓ 1024-bit master secret key chosen by CT xCTUi 1024-bit secret key chosen by CT
AUiCT Temporary Variable VCTUi Temporary Variable
P 1i Temporary Variable used by MUi P
2
i Temporary Variable used by MUi
RPWSj Masked password of LSSNSj Cj Temporary masked password of LSSNSj
E1, E2 Temporary Variables used by LSSNSj fSj Temporary Variable used by LSSNSj
PIDSj pseudo-identity of LSSNSj SNj Serial number of LSSNSj
(xui , yui) The real location coordinate of MUi Indexui The encrypted real index of user’s location
SK Symmetric key KMUi,F SK shared between MUi and its friends F
SKMUi,CT SK shared between MUi and CT SKCT,Sj SK shared between CT and LSSNSj
Θ The set of social friends of MUi δ(·) The euclidean distance function among users
Dfui The registered distance threshold of MUi dsUi Distance threshold for strangers’ location query
Tui Timestamp generated by MUi Tct Timestamp generated by CT
H(·) One way cryptographic hash function Ek(·)/Dk(·) Symmetric encryption/decryption using key k
||,⊕ Concatenation, bitwise XOR operations A→ B : 〈M〉 A sends message M to B via public channel
4T Maximum transmission delay qfui Friend location query distance limit
an open research problem to many popular OSNs. The CEO
of Facebook has recently published an article “A Privacy-
Focused Vision for Social Networking", which claims that the
OSN giant is planning to implement end-to-end encryption
on all its messaging services to increase privacy levels,
and it has started experimenting with end-to-end encryption
already [35]. The lack of privacy in OSNs leads to various
security hazards like the identity theft, information leakage,
and government impinge on user privacy [36]. However, the
proposed scheme does not aim at providing complete end-to-
end encryption on all messages between mobile user and the
social media service provider.
The idea proposed in this paper serves three basic pur-
poses. First, it provides centralized storage of location-based
information and social information into single entity [34].
Second, it ensures secure communication of location sharing
and update based messages, thus protecting them from vari-
ous malicious attackers. Finally, for location sharing, it facil-
itates a low computation and communication cost on mobile
device, as it avoids encryption via public key infrastructure
(PKI). These make the proposed scheme suitable for practical
environments.
We find that existing centralized location sharing of the
scheme suffer from the man-in-the-middle attack, replay at-
tack, and DoS attack [37]. Our contribution is to secure
location sharing and location query based messages and to
protect them from adversary. We do not exploit direct key
sharing between the user and the service provider. As shown
in Figure 3, MUi goes through a three-factor authentication
process with CT , and establish the session key SKMUi,CT
(= SKCT,MUi), shared with CT . All location-based mes-
sages between MUi and CT are encrypted with this key.
Similarly, Figure 4 shows how CT and LSSNS authen-
ticate and establish their shared session key SKSj ,CT (=
SKCT,Sj ).
III. MATHEMATICAL FUNDAMENTALS
To describe our proposed scheme, we have applied the
collision-resistant one-way hash function [38], Chebyshev
polynomial [39], [40], biometrics and fuzzy extractor, bitwise
XOR operator. In this section, we describe these fundamental
concepts in brief.
A. THE COLLISION-RESISTANT ONE-WAY HASH
FUNCTION
The input to a one-way cryptographic hash function H:
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k is any string of 0 and 1. That is, s ∈
{0, 1}∗. The output of the function is another binary string
H(s) ∈ {0, 1}k whose length is fixed k bits. The property of
collision-resistant of H(·) is described in the following [41].
Definition 1. The advantage probability of any adversary
A’s to find any collision with the execution time tn is denoted
and defined byAdvHASHA (tn) = Pr[(p, q)∈R A: p 6= q and
H(p) = H(q)], where Pr[M ] is the probability of an event
M and an adversary A selects a random pair (p, q). By an
(ε, tn)-adversary A attacks the collision resistance of H(·),
it specify that the computation time of A is at most tn and
that AdvHASHA (tn) ≤ ε.
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FIGURE 1: The architecture for location sharing in the mOSN through multiserver system.
B. THE CHEBYSHEV POLYNOMIAL: DEFINITION AND
PROPERTIES
The Chebyshev polynomial Tn(x) : [−1, 1] → [−1, 1] of
degree n is defined as [39]:
Tn(x) =
{
cos(n · arccos(x)) ifx ∈ [−1, 1]
cos(nθ) ifx = cosθ, θ ∈ [0, π].




1 whenn is equal to 0
x whenn is equal to 1
whenn is greater
2xTn−1(x)− Tn−2(x) than or equal to 2.
Definition 2. The semi-group property of the enhanced
Chebyshev polynomial holds on the interval (−∞,+∞) and
is defined as follows [42]. Tn(x) = 2xTn−1(x) − Tn−2(x)
(mod p), where n ≥ 2, x ∈ (−∞,+∞), and p is a large
prime number. Here, Tr(Ts(x)) ≡ Trs(x) ≡ Ts(Tr(x))
(mod p), where Z∗p = {a|0 < a < p, gcd(a, p) = 1}
= {1, 2, . . . , p− 1}.
Definition 3. For any given x and y, it is computationally
infeasible to find an integer s such that Ts(x) = y. It
is referred to as the Chaotic map-based discrete logarithm
problem (CMDLP) [43]. The advantage probability of A to
solve CMDLP is AdvCMDLPA (t2) = Pr[A(x, y) = r : r ∈
Z∗p , y = Tr(x) (mod p)].
C. THE BIOMETRICS AND FUZZY EXTRACTOR
For secure authentication, various authentication protocols
use some biometrics features, such as iris and fingerprint
as the key for their uniqueness property [44], [45]. Using
the Fuzzy extractor technique, we can produce the identical
output string, though the input biometric will differ from the
stored biometric samples up to a given threshold limit for
permissible error tolerance. The Fuzzy extractor is defined
by two algorithms: Generate(·) and Reproduce(·), which
are deterministic and probabilistic.
Definition 4. Let us suppose that a biometric key of length n
bits is generated from the biometrics B. We also consider that
R = {0, 1}k is a metric space of finite dimensional biometric
data points. The following two functions are defined next.
• Generate: This function generates a pair (η, µ), where
η ∈ {0, 1}n represents the biometric key and µ is
a public value which is used as a parameter by the
Reproduce function for a given input B ∈ R.
• Reproduce:This function regenerates the original bio-
metric key η = Reproduce(Bi, µ), where η ∈ {0, 1}n
from the entered biometrics Bi and original biometrics
B and Bi are close in terms of some distance metric such
as the Hamming distance. To be close, this distance must
not to be more than E . E is a pre-defined threshold value.
IV. THE ADVERSARY MODEL AND SYSTEM MODEL
This section briefly describes the basic attack model or
adversary model applicable for our proposed scheme. More-
over, we depict the outline of the system model adopted for
our proposed location sharing scheme for the online social
network.
A. THE THREAT MODEL
We primarily assume that cellular tower (CT ) is a trusted
body and define the threat model concerning the location-
sharing social network servers (LSSNSs) and the user (U).
We define the model below:
• Registered entities like U , LSSNS and CT commu-
nicate through a public insecure wireless channel. The
proposed scheme adopts the widely-accepted Dolev-
Yao threat model (DY model) [46]. An attacker or a
malicious user has all the capabilities of executing all
potential attacks defined in the classical DY model.
• A registered or authorized user or a privileged insider of
the system may turn into a malicious user, who illegally
intends to access various location or social information
of other genuine users.
• LSSNSs exhibit an ‘honest but curious’ nature. They
alone, or after colluding with other servers, try to re-
trieve the social network topology or location informa-
tion of other registered users.
• Our proposed scheme assumes CT to be a trusted entity.
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B. THE SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 1 shows the basic system model of the proposed
scheme. Here, we define the basic entities, which are de-
scribed as follows:
• Mobile user (U): Sends and responds to three types
of request queries. These include sharing of location
information to other social friends and strangers, up-
dating own location information and querying a friend’s
location information.
• Location Sharing Social Network Servers (LSSNS):
Responsible for storing, updating and informing various
location information of U .
• Cellular Tower (CT): : It is a trusted entity, which
receives, processes and forwards various messages of U
and LSSNS. All messages communicated between U
and LSSNS are communicated via CT .
The overall flow of the model is shown in Figure 1. First,
the mobile user and the Location Sharing Social Network
Server LSSNSj register to a cellular tower CT (process A).
This is a one-time operation and is executed through a secure
channel. Next, the mobile user MUi and LSSNSj make
a secure login to the registered CT and establish a shared
session key (processes B and C respectively). Thereafter, the
mobile user registers a distance threshold to LSSNSj via
CT , in which corresponding social friends can be searched
(process D). When required, the mobile user updates his/her
current location to LSSNSj through the cellular tower
(process E). Finally, the mobile user obtains his/her social
friends’ identities and locations for those who are willing to
share their information from LSSNSj through the cellular
tower (process F).
In general, three major security challenges are primar-
ily faced by location sharing schemes designed for mOSN
applications. First, various location-based services must be
privacy-preserving. An attacker or malicious user must not be
able to access and/or modify personal information of U . Sec-
ond, to ensure user location privacy, LSSNS should store
various fake or dummy identities of U . Finally, a physical
distance threshold between U and friend or stranger of U
must be registered. A location query about U ’s friends or
strangers are processed only if their current physical distance
is within that predefined distance threshold.
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In order to design the proposed scheme, various symbols are
used. The symbols and notations are tabulated in Table 1.
A. THE REGISTRATION PHASE
This phase involves two distinct registration processes,
namely, (a) the registration of a mOSN user (MUi) to a
cellular tower, and (b) the registration of a LSSNSj to a
cellular tower. The registration process is a one-time opera-
tion that is executed through a secure channel; the message
communication for this phase is shown in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2: Message Communication in Registration Phase. Please
refer to Sections V-A1 and V-A2.
1) Mobile User Registration
In this phase, a series of steps are executed for the registration
of a mobile user MUi to the CT . These steps are as follows.
Step UR1:
1) MUi selects own identity, password, and biometrics as
IDi, PWi, Bi respectively.
2) MUi selects parameters n and λ, which are two 128-
bit random numbers.
Step UR2:
1) MUi uses the fuzzy extractor (·) function to pro-
duce (ηi, µi) = Generation(Bi) and computes the
biometric embedded password MPWBi = H(IDi||
H(PWi|| ηi ||n)).
2) Through a secure channel, MUi delivers its registra-
tion message {IDi, dfUi , dsUi , (MPWBi⊕λ)} to the
CT .
Note that IDi and PWi are randomized by concatenating
128-bit (16-byte) random numbers [43], [47], [48]. We mask
the user id and password as MPWBi = H(IDi|| H(PWi||
ηi ||n)). Thus, guessing of IDi and PWi from MPWBi is
infeasible, as it is computationally hard to guess three secrets
simultaneously. An 128-bit random number can generate
1038 possible values (as 2128 ≈ 1038). So, the guessing
possibility is only ≈ 11038 [49], [47].
Step UR3:
1) CT randomly selects its own 1024-bit master secret
key XΓ.
2) For each 〈CT ↔ MUi〉 pair, CT randomly selects a
1024-bit secret key xCTUi .
3) CT computes AUiCT = H(H(IDi ⊕xCTUi ) ||XΓ),
VCTUi = AUiCT ⊕MPWBi.
4) CT chooses its pseudo-identity as RIDΓ =
H(IDCT ||XΓ).
Step UR4:
1) CT provides an anonymous temporary identity for
each mOSN user MUi. This is done by selecting a
random but temporary identity TIDi for each user
MUi.
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2) CT saves m 〈CT ↔ MUi〉 key-plus-id combinations
{TIDi, (IDCT , VCTUi , RIDΓ) | 1 ≤ j ≤ m} in
mobile device of MUi.
Note that for all MUis, the CT saves the record
{IDi, T IDi, xCTUi} in own database.
Step UR5:
1) MUi computes P 1i = H(PWi|| ηi) ⊕n and P 2i =
H(IDi ||PWi ||ηi ||n).
2) MUi modifies VCTUi as V
′
CTUi
= VCTUi ⊕λ, RIDi =
TIDi⊕ H(IDi ||V ′CTUi ) and RID
′
Γ = RIDΓ ⊕
H(ηi||n) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
3) MUi stores parameters 〈µi, P 1i , P 2i , V ′CTUi s, RIDis
and RID′Γ〉 and removes VCTUi s, RIDΓ and TIDis
from own mobile device.
2) The Location Sharing Social Network Server Registration
Phase
Each location sharing social network server LSSNSj regis-
ters to the cellular tower CT through the following steps:
Step SR1:
1) LSSNSj chooses own id and password as IDSj and
PWSj .
2) It selects one random number b of 128-bit long.
Step SR2:
1) LSSNSj computes masked password RPWSj =
H(IDSj ||PWSj ) and Cj = H(IDSj ||PWSj ||b).
2) LSSNSj submits 〈IDSj , Cj〉 to CT via a secure
channel.
Step SR3:
1) CT uses its master secret key XΓ and one ran-
dom number r (128-bit) to compute Kj =
H(H(IDSj ||XΓ) ⊕ r), and E1 = Kj ⊕ Cj = Kj⊕
H(IDSj ||PWSj ||b).
2) CT embeds the parameters {E1, TXΓ(Kj)} in mem-
ory of each LSSNSj .
3) CT saves pair 〈IDSj , SNj , r〉 into its database, where
SNj is the identity or serial number of the server
LSSNSj .
Step SR4:
1) LSSNSj computes E2 = RPWSj ⊕ b and fSj =
H(RPWSj ||b).
2) LSSNSj stores E2, fSj , H(·) into its own memory.
The Summary of registration process of MUi and
LSSNSj to CT is shown in Figure 3.
B. THE MOSN USER LOGIN, AUTHENTICATION AND
KEY ESTABLISHMENT PHASE
The mOSN user MUi makes a secure login to the registered
CT and establishes a shared session key through the follow-
ing steps:
Step ULA1:
1) MUi inputs own identity, password, and biomerics
(noisy) as IDi, PWi, and B′i respectively.
mOSN user (MUi) Cellular tower (CT )
Input IDi, PWi and Bi.
Select 128-bit numbers n and λ.
Compute (ηi, µi) = Generation(Bi),
MPWBi = H(IDi|| H(PWi|| ηi ||n)).
{IDi,(MPWBi⊕λ)}−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Securechannel
Select own master secret key XΓ.
Select xCTUi for each {CT ↔MUi} pair.
Compute AUiCT = H(H(IDi ⊕ xCTUi )||XΓ),
VCTUi = AUiCT ⊕MPWBi,
RIDΓ = H(IDCT ||XΓ).
Select temporary identity TIDi for each MUi.
For all {CT ↔MUi} pairs, store
{TIDi, (IDCT , VCTUi , RIDΓ)} in memory
of MUi.
Store record {IDi, T IDi, xCTUi} in CT .
{MobileDevice}←−−−−−−−−−−−
Securechannel
Compute P 1i = H(PWi||ηi)⊕ n,
P 2i = H(IDi||PWi||ηi||n),
V ′CTUi
= VCTUi ⊕ λ
Compute
RIDi = TIDi ⊕H(IDi||V ′CTUi ),
RID′Γ = RIDΓ ⊕H(ηi||n).
Store {µi, P 1i , P 2i , V ′CTUi s, RIDis,
RID′Γ} into own device memory.
Delete VCTUi s, RIDΓ and TIDis
from MUi mobile device memory.
Location Sharing Social Network Cellular tower (CT )
Server (LSSNSj)
Selects id, password as IDSj and PWSj
and 128-bit number b randomly.
RPWSj = H(IDSj ||PWSj ),
Cj = H(IDSj ||PWSj ||b).
〈IDSj ,Cj〉−−−−−−−−−→
securechannel
Generate 128-bit number r randomly.
Using the master secret key XΓ,
Computes Kj = H(H(IDSj ||XΓ)⊕ r),
TXΓ(Kj), E1 = Kj ⊕ Cj .
servermemory{E1,TXΓ (Kj)}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
securechannel
Computes E2 = RPWSj ⊕ b, Stores 〈IDSj , SNj , r〉 into own database.
fSj = H(RPWSj ||b).
Store E2, fSj , H(·),
into server memory.
FIGURE 3: The Registration phases of MUi and LSSNSj in the
proposed scheme
2) Using stored µi and P 1i , MUi computes ηi =
Reproduction(B′i, µi) and generates n′ = P 1i ⊕
H(PWi ||ηi).
3) MUi calculates H(IDi ||PWi ||n′ ||ηi) and compares
with stored P 2i .
4) If the verification succeeds, go to Step ULA2, else, exit.
Step ULA2:
1) MUi randomly generates Ωui (128-bit number).
2) Using stored paratemer V ′CTUi , MUi computes :
a) MPWBi = H(IDi|| H(PWi|| n′ ||ηi)).




c) M1 = AUiCT⊕ Ωui⊕ Tui⊕ H(IDCT ).
d) TIDi = RIDi ⊕H(IDi|| V ′CTUi ).
e) TID∗i = TIDi⊕ H(IDCT || Tui)
3) MUi uses the current login timestamp Tui and com-
putes a hash value H1 = H(IDi|| M1|| Ωui || Tui).
4) Through a public channel, MUi sends {TID∗i ,M1,
H1, Tui} to CT .
Step ULA3:
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1) CT verifies if |T ∗ui − Tui |
?
≤ 4T . If verification holds
go to step 2, else exit.
2) CT calculates TIDi = TID∗i⊕ H(IDCT ||Tui).
3) Corresponding to calculated TIDi, CT finds the
record 〈{IDi, xCTUi}〉 from own database.
4) CT computes BCTUi = H(H(IDi ⊕ xCTUi )||XΓ).
5) CT computes P1 =M1 ⊕Tui ⊕H(IDCT )⊕BCTUi
= Ωui .
Note that CT obtaines P1 of step (5), as AUiCT = BCTUi
= H(H(IDi⊕ xCTUi )|| XΓ).
Step ULA4:
1) CT uses received parameters to prepares a hash value
H2 = H(IDi ||M1 ||P1 ||Tui).
2) CT verifies ifH2
?
= H1. If verification holds go to step
3, else exit.
3) CT saves the record 〈IDi,Ωui , Tui〉 in its database.
4) CT generates a 128-bit random number Ωct.
5) CT computesM2 = BCTUi⊕ Ωct⊕ Tct⊕ IDi. Here
Tct is the current timestamp of CT .
6) CT computes shared session key SKCT,MUi =
H(IDi ||IDCT ||BCTUi ||P1 ||Ωct ||Tui ||Tct).
7) CT prepares hash value H3 = H(IDi ||P1 ||Ωct ||Tui
||Tct ||SKCT,MUi).
8) Through public channel, CT sends authentication re-
sponse message {M2, H3, Tct} to MUi.
Step ULA5:
1) MUi receives an authentication response message
from step 8 of ULA4.
2) MUi verifies the transmission delay by comparing
received and current timestamps. Go to step 3, if veri-
fication holds, else exit.
3) MUi computes P2 =M2⊕Tct⊕IDi⊕AUiCT = Ωct.
Note that we obtain P2 of step (3), as AUiCT = BCTUi
= H(H(IDi ⊕xCTUi ) ||XΓ).
Step ULA6
1) MUi generates a session key (mutually shared with
CT ) as SKMUi,CT = H(IDi ||IDCT ||AUiCT ||Ωui
||P2 ||Tui ||Tct).
2) MUi computes final hash value H4 = H(IDi ||Ωui
||P2 ||Tui ||Tct ||SKMUi,CT ).
3) If H4
?
= H3, then MUi confirms that the session key
SKMUi,CT (= SKCT,MUi) is mutually verified and
established. Else, MUi discards the session key and
terminates the process.
For all message communicaions in the current session,
MUi and CT use this key for message encryption.
The Summary of mOSN user login, authentication and key
establishment phase with CT is shown in Figure 5 and the
message communications of Login, Authentication and Key
Establishment Phase is shown in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4: Message Communication in Login, Authentication and
Key Establishment Phase. Please refer to Sections V-B and V-C.
C. THE LSSNSJ LOGIN, AUTHENTICATION AND KEY
ESTABLISHMENT PHASE
The LSSNSj makes a secure login to the registered cellular
tower CT and establishes a shared session key through the
following steps:
Step SLA1:
1) LSSNSj inputs own id IDSj and password PWSj .
2) LSSNSj generates RPW1 = H(IDSj ||PWSj ) and
b1 = E2⊕ PWB1.
3) LSSNSj uses generated b1 and computes f ′Sj =H(RPW1
||b1).
4) LSSNSj verifies if fSj
?
= f ′Sj . If verification holds,
go to step SLA2, else exit.
Step SLA2:
1) LSSNSj computes C = E1⊕H(IDSj || PWSj ||b1).
2) LSSNSj generates random number sj .
3) LSSNSj computes Tsj (C).
4) LSSNSj computes K1 = Tsj (TXΓ(C)).
Step SLA3:
1) LSSNSj generates 128-bit random number Ωsj .
2) LSSNSj computes R1 = C⊕ Ωsj⊕ Tsj (C)⊕ TSj .
Here, TSj is the current timestamp of LSSNSj .
3) LSSNSj generates its pseudo identity PIDSj =
IDSj ⊕ H(K1).
4) LSSNSj computes MSj = H(IDSj || C ||K1 ||Ωsj ||
TSj )
5) Finally, through a public channel, LSSNSj sends its
login request {PIDSj , Tsj (C), R1, MSj , TSj} to the
cellular tower CT .
Step SLA4:
1) CT receives login message and verifies if |T ∗Sj − TSj |
?
≤ 4T . If verification holds go to step 2, else exit. Here,
T ∗Sj is the current timestamp.
2) CT calculates K ′1 = TXΓ(Tsj (C)).
3) CT calculates ID′Sj = PIDSj ⊕H(K
′
1) = IDSj
⊕H(K1) ⊕H(K ′1) = IDSj .
4) CT verifies if K ′1
?
= K1. If verification holds, CT
ensures that ID′Sj = IDSj and go to step 5.
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mOSN user (MUi) Cellular Tower (CT )
Login phase
Input IDi, PWi, and B′i.
Compute
ηi = Reproduction(B′i, µi)
n′ = P 1i ⊕ H(PWi ||ηi).
Verifies if stored P 2i = H(IDi ||PWi ||n’ ||ηi)?
If verification holds,
Generate 128-bit number Ωui
Compute





M1 = AUiCT⊕ Ωui⊕ Tui⊕ H(IDCT )
TIDi = RIDi ⊕H(IDi|| V ′CTUi )
TID∗i = TIDi⊕ H(IDCT || Tui)
H1 = H(IDi|| M1|| Ωui || Tui)
{TID∗i ,M1, H1, Tui}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(public channel)
Authentication phase






Find the record 〈{IDi, xCTUi }〉 from own database.
Compute
BCTUi = H(H(IDi ⊕ xCTUi )||XΓ).
P1 =M1 ⊕ Tui ⊕H(IDCT )⊕BCTUi .
= Ωui , as AUiCT = BCTUi = H(H(IDi ⊕ xCTUi )||XΓ),
H2 = H(IDi ||M1 ||P1 ||Tui).
Verify if H2 = H1 ?
If verification holds, accepts the user login request.
Save the record 〈IDi,Ωui , Tui〉 in its database.
Generate 128-bit random number Ωct
Compute
M2 = BCTUi⊕ Ωct⊕ Tct⊕ IDi,
Compute session key as
SKCT,MUi = H(IDi ||IDCT ||BCTUi ||P1 ||Ωct ||Tui ||Tct),
Compute hash value as
H3 = H(IDi ||P1 ||Ωct ||Tui ||Tct ||SKCT,MUi).
{M2, H3, Tct}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(public channel)
Verify if |T ∗ct − Tct| ≤ 4T ?
Compute
P2 =M2 ⊕ Tct ⊕ IDi ⊕AUiCT ,
= Ωct, as AUiCT = BCTUi = H(H(IDi ⊕xCTUi ) ||XΓ).
Compute session key as
SKMUi,CT = H(IDi ||IDCT ||AUiCT ||Ωui ||P2 ||Tui ||Tct)
Compute hash value
H4 = H(IDi ||Ωui ||P2 ||Tui ||Tct ||SKMUi,CT ).
Verify if H4 = H3?
If verification holds,
store session key SKMUi,CT (= SKCT,MUi). Store session key SKCT,MUi (= SKMUi,CT ).
FIGURE 5: mOSN user login, authentication and key establishment phase in the proposed scheme.
5) CT finds the record 〈IDSj , SNj , r〉 in the database.
6) CT further computes C ′ = H(H(ID′Sj ||XΓ)⊕ r).
7) CT computes R2 = R1⊕ TSj⊕ C ′⊕ Tsj (C) =
H(H(IDSj ||XΓ) ⊕r) ⊕Ωsj ⊕TSj ⊕Tsj (C)) ⊕TSj
⊕H(H(IDSj ||XΓ) ⊕r) ⊕Tsj (C) = Ωsj .
8) CT uses the received parameters TSj and calculates
R3 = H(ID′Sj ||C
′||K ′1||R2||TSj ).
9) CT verifies whetherR3
?
= R2.
10) On successful verification, CT accepts the login re-
quest and considers the Location Server LSSNSj as
authentic. Otherwise, CT terminates the session and
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1) CT selects a 128-bit random number ΩCT .
2) CT computes R4 = C ′⊕ ΩCT⊕ TCT = H(H(IDSj
||XΓ) ⊕r) ⊕ΩCT ⊕TCT . Here, TCT is the current
timestamp of CT .
3) CT computes the mutually shared session key
SKCT,Sj = H(C
′||K ′1|| TSj || TCT || R2|| ΩCT ).
4) CT computes MCT = H(IDSj || SKCT,Sj || R2||
ΩCT || TSj || TCT ).
5) Through a public channel,CT sends the authentication
response message {R4,MCT , TCT } to LSSNSj .
Step SLA6:
1) LSSNSj receives the authentication response mes-
sage from CT .
2) LSSNSj verifies the transmission delay |T ∗CT −
TCT |
?
≤ 4T , where T ∗CT is the current timestamp. If
verification holds, go to step 3, else exit.
3) LSSNSj computes R5 = C ′⊕ R4⊕ TCT =
H(H(ID′Sj ||XΓ) ⊕r) ⊕H(H(IDSj ||XΓ) ⊕r)
⊕ΩCT ⊕TCT ⊕TCT = ΩCT .
Step SLA7:
1) LSSNSj generates the session key mutually shared
with CT as SKSj ,CT = H(C ||K1 ||TSj ||TCT ||ΩCT
||R5).
2) LSSNSj verifies MCT
?
=H(IDSj ||SKSj ,CT ||ΩCT
||R5 ||TSj ||TCT ).
3) If verification succeeds, LSSNSj confirms that the
cellular tower CT is authentic and the current session
key SKSj ,CT (= SKCT,Sj ) is mutually verified and
established. Otherwise, discard the session key and
exit.
The summary of the LSSNSj login, authentication and
key establishment phase is shown in Figure 6.
D. THE DISTANCE THRESHOLD REGISTRATION PHASE
Every registered mOSN user MUi needs to register a dis-
tance threshold to LSSNSj in which corresponding social
friends can be searched and the message communications of
Distance Threshold Registration Phase is shown in Figure 7.
Step DR1:
1) MUi decides a distance threshold Dfui beyond which
MUi does not allow his/her social friends to find
himself in a friends’ location query.
2) MUi sends encrypted distance registration message
Msg1dreg = 〈ESKMUi,CT (IDi|| Dfui || RNui || TSui ||
Rflag = 1), H(IDi|| RNui || TSui), TSui〉.
Here, RNui , TSui , H(·) and E(·) convey their meaning
as tabulated in Table 1.Rflag = 1 indicates that this message
in intended for the distance threshold registration.
Location Sharing Social Network Cellular tower
Server (LSSNSj) (CT )
Login phase
Input IDSj and PWSj
Compute
RPW1 = H(IDSj ||PWSj )
b1 = E2⊕ PWB1
Verifies if stored fSj = H(RPW1||b1)?
If verification holds,
Generate 128-bit number sj and Ωsj
Compute
C = E1⊕ H(IDSj || PWSj ||b1)
K1 = Tsj (TXΓ(C))




MSj = H(IDSj || C ||K1 ||Ωsj || TSj )
{PIDSj , Tsj (C),R1,MSj , TSj}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(public channel)
Authentication phase
Verify if |T ∗Sj − TSj | ≤ 4T ?
Compute
K ′1 = TXΓ(Tsj (C)),
ID′Sj = PIDSj ⊕H(K
′
1) = IDSj ,
Corresponding to IDSj ,
Find the record 〈IDSj , SNj , r〉 from own database.
Compute
C ′ = H(H(ID′Sj ||XΓ)⊕ r).
R2 =R1⊕ TSj⊕ C ′⊕ Tsj (C),
= H(H(IDSj ||XΓ)⊕ r)⊕ Ωsj ⊕ TSj ⊕ Tsj (C))
⊕TSj ⊕H(H(IDSj ||XΓ)⊕ r)⊕ Tsj (C),
= Ωsj ,
Using received TSj , Compute






CT accepts the login request.
Generate 128-bit random number ΩCT
Compute
R4 = C ′ ⊕ ΩCT ⊕ TCT ,
= H(H(IDSj ||XΓ)⊕ r)⊕ ΩCT ⊕TCT
Compute session key as
SKCT,Sj = H(C
′||K ′1|| TSj || TCT || R2|| ΩCT ),
Compute hash value MCT as
MCT = H(IDSj || SKCT,Sj || R2|| ΩCT || TSj || TCT ).
{R4,MCT , TCT }←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(public channel)
Verify if |T ∗CT − TCT | ≤ 4T ?
Compute
R5 = C ′⊕ R4⊕ TCT
= H(H(ID′Sj ||XΓ)⊕ r)⊕H(H(IDSj ||XΓ)⊕ r)
⊕ΩCT ⊕ TCT ⊕ TCT
= ΩCT ,
Compute session key as
SKSj ,CT = H(C||K1||TSj ||TCT ||ΩCT ||R5)
Compute and verify hash value
MCT
?
= H(IDSj ||SKSj ,CT ||ΩCT ||R5||TSj ||TS2).
If verification holds,
store session key SKSj ,CT (= SKCT,Sj ) Store session key SKCT,Sj (= SKSj ,CT ).
FIGURE 6: The LSSNSj login, authentication and key establish-
ment phases of the proposed scheme
FIGURE 7: Message Communication in Distance Threshold Regis-
tration Phase refer to Section V-D.
Step DR2:




2) CT verifies if |TS∗ui − TSui |
?
≤ 4T , where TS∗ui is
the current timestamp. If verification holds, go to step
3, else terminate and exit.
3) CT computes the hash value H(IDi|| RNui || TSui).
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If the computed and received hash values are same,
then go to step 4, else discards the message and exit.
4) CT logs in to LSSNSj and establishes the shared
session key SKCT,Sj as explained in subsection V-C.
5) CT encrypts and sends the distance registration mes-
sage as Msg2dreg = 〈ESKCT,Sj (IDi|| Dfui || RNui ||
RNct|| TSct|| Rflag = 1), H(IDi|| RNct|| TSct),
TSct〉 to LSSNSj .
Step DR3:
1) LSSNSj decrypts Msg2dreg using the session key
SKSj ,CT .
2) LSSNSj verifies communication delay using the re-
ceived and current timestamp values.
3) LSSNSj verifies message integrity and authenticity
by computing and comparing hash values with de-
crypted parameters.
4) If verifications of steps (2) and (3) are successful, go
to Step 5, else terminate the session and exit.
5) LSSNSj saves record {IDi,Dfui} and sends re-
sponse message Msg1resp = ESKCT,Sj (IDi ||RNui
||RNct ||‘ok′) to CT .
Step DR4:
1) CT decrypts Msg1resp using the shared session key.
2) CT verifies the received random number RNct and
sends Msg2resp = ESKCT,MUi (IDi||RNui ||‘ok
′) to
MUi.
3) MUi decrypts the message Msg2resp using the shared
session key SKMUi,CT
4) MUi verifies the random number RNui . If these ver-
ification holds, go to step 5.Otherwise, termiate the
session and exit.
5) MUi reads ‘ok′ message and distance registration
process successfully terminates.
E. THE USER LOCATION UPDATE PHASE
In this subsection, we describe how mOSN userMUi updates
his current location to the Location Sharing Social Network
Server LSSNSj and the message communications of User
Location Update Phase is shown in Figure 8. The location
updation is done through the cellular towerCT , following the
steps as mentioned in subsection V-B, MUi makes a secure
login to CT and mutually estabsishes a shared session key
SKMUi,CT (= SKCT,MUi). Next, it executes the following
steps:
Step LU1:
1) MUi selects a one-time 128-bit random numberRNui .
2) MUi uses the shared session key SKMUi,CT and sends
an encrypted message Msg1 = ESKMUi,CT (IDi||
xui || yui || EKMUi,F (xui , yui)|| RNui || TSui) to CT .
3) MUi sends a hash value H1 = H(IDi|| xui || yui ||
EKMUi,F (xui , yui)|| RNui || TSui) to CT .
FIGURE 8: Message Communication in User Location Update
Phase. Please refer to Section V-E.
Note that, (xui , yui) is the current location of MUi, and
EKMUi,F (xui , yui) is the current location of MUi encrypted
with the symmetric key {KMUi,F}, mutually shared between
MUi and all trusted friend F .
Step LU2:
1) CT receives location update message {Msg1, H1}
from MUi.
2) CT uses SKCT,MUi and decrypts Msg1 as
DSKCT,MUi (Msg1).
3) CT retrieves parameters IDi, (xui , yui),EKMUi,F (xui ,
yui), RNui and TSui respectively (from step 2).
4) CT verifies if |TS∗ui − TSui |
?
≤ 4T , where TS∗ui is
the current timestamp. If the verification holds then go
to step LU3, else discards the received message and
exit.
Step LU3:
1) CT uses the decrypted parameter and computes a hash
value H2 = H(IDi|| xui || yui || EKMUi,F (xui , yui)||
RNui || TSui).
2) CT verifies if H2
?
= H1. If the verification holds then
go to step 3, else terminate the session and exit.
3) CT confirms the authenticity and integrity of the mes-
sage and makes a login to LSSNSj .
4) CT and LSSNSj establishes a mutually shared ses-
sion key SKCT,Sj as mentioned in subsection V-C.
Step LU4:
1) CT generates L − 1 dummy locations and L −
1 dummy encrypted string chosen randomly as
{x∗i , y∗i , enc∗i }i=1...L−1.
2) CT randomly put MUi’s real updated location in-
formation string at the nth place among the dummy
information set, (1 ≤ n ≤ L).
3) The sequence number of MUi’s real location update
information is encrypted by CT with its own master
secret key XΓ, i.e., Indexui = EXΓ [Sequence(xui ||
yui || EKMUi,F (xui , yui))].
Step LU5:
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Mobile user (MUi) Cellular Tower (CT ) Location Storing Social
Network Server (LSSNSj)
{Login request to CT}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(public channel)
Establish session key SKCT,MUi
{Authentication response to MUi}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(public channel)
Establish session key SKMUi,CT
Compute
Msg1 = ESKMUi,CT (IDi||xui ||yui ||
EKMUi,F (xui , yui)||RNui ||TSui)




Decrypts Msg1 as DSKCT,MUi (Msg1)
Verify if |TS∗ui − TSui | ≤ 4T ?
Compute
H2 = H(IDi||xui ||yui ||EKMUi,F
(xui , yui)||RNui ||TSui)
Verify if H2 = H1?
[accept/reject]
{Login request to LSSNSj}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(public channel)




Establish session key SKCT,Sj
Randomly generate {x∗i , y∗i , enc∗i }i=1...L−1
Set real location at nth place (1 ≤ n ≤ L)
Compute
Indexui = EXΓ [Seq(xui ||yui ||EKMUi,F (xui , yui))]
Msg2 = {IDi, (x∗1, y∗1 , enc∗1), . . . , (xui , yui ,







H3 = H(LSSNSj ||Msg2||RNct)
{ESKCT,Sj (Msg2||RNct||TSct), H3, TSct}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(public channel)
Decrypts DSKSj,CT (Msg2)
Verify if |TS∗ct − TSct| ≤ 4T ?
Compute and verify hash value
[accept/reject]
Update the user location.
Compute





Verify correctness of RNct
[accept/reject]
(public channel)
FIGURE 9: User location update phase of the proposed scheme
1) CT prepares the message Msg2 = {IDi, (x∗1, y∗1 , enc∗1), . . . , (xui , yui , EKMUi,F (xui , yui)), . . . , (x
∗
L,
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2) CT generates a 128-bit random number RNct.
3) sends {LSSNSj , ESKCT,Sj (Msg2|| RNct|| TSct),
H(LSSNSj || Msg2|| RNct), TSct} to server
LSSNSj .
Step LU6:
1) LSSNSj uses its session key SKSj ,CT (shared with
CT ) and decrypts the message Msg2, random number
RNct, and timestamp TSct.
2) LSSNSj checks the transmission delay using the re-
ceived and current timestamps.
3) LSSNSj checks message integrity by checking com-
puting a fresh hash value from the decrypted parame-
ters.
4) LSSNSj updates the user location and sendsMsg3 =
ESKSj,CT (IDi||LSSNSj ||RNct||‘ok
′) to CT .
Step LU7:
1) CT uses the session key SKCT,Sj and decryptsMsg3.
2) CT verifies the correctness of RNct. If it is correct, go
to step 3, else terminate the session and exit.
3) CT forwards ‘ok′ to MUi.
The user location update phase is summarized in Figure 9.
Remark 2. When the user reaches a new place, he/she
updates his/her location in the LSSNS’s database to ensure
that LSSNS knows the user’s real-time location. MUi exe-
cutes the user location update phase and sends the current lo-
cation coordinate (xui , yui) (obtained by GPS) to LSSNS.
As the user location update phase of our proposed scheme is
based only on the private key encryption, cryptographic hash
function and xor operation, it is both secure and lightweight.
Table 4 reveals that considering all the entities, this location
update process takes only 0.0721 second. Hence, LSSNS
can update the current location of MUi very quickly.
Depending on the population density, potential users, etc.,
the LTE technology nowadays requires cellular towers (or
BTSs) to be spaced in the range of 2km to 5km [50]. When
the mOSN user MUi moves to a new cellular tower zone,
he/she needs to register to CT . Once the registration is
complete, MUi provides his/her location update to LSSNS
and access other location-based services from LSSNS. This
mobile user registration process is a one-time task and incurs
very small computation cost on a mobile device. As presented
in Figure 2 and Table 3, MUi registration has the computa-
tion cost of 5*TH + 5*TX + TFE , which essentially takes
only 0.0656 second. This evidences that the user registration
process is very efficient.
F. THE FRIENDS’ LOCATIONS QUERY PHASE
In this subsection, we describe how MUi achieves his/her
social friends’ identity and location, who are willing to share
their information. The message communications of Friends’
Locations Query Phase is shown in Figure 10.
FIGURE 10: The Message Communication in Friends’ Locations
Query Phase. Please refer to Section V-F.
Step FLQ1:
1) MUi makes a secure login to CT and mutually estab-
lishes a shared session key SKMUi,CT (= SKCT,MUi)
(As explained in subsection V-B).
2) MUi sends {ESKMUi,CT (IDi|| F|| qfui ||TSui ⊕
RNui), H(IDi|| F|| qfui ||RNui), TSui} to CT .
Note that the message F is a request to find ‘friends’.
TSui , RNui , E(·) and H(·) convey their usual meanings
as explained in Table 1.
Step FLQ2:
1) CT receives request fromMUi, and checks if |TS∗ui−
TSui |
?
≤ 4T . Here, TS∗ui is the current timestamp. If
the verification holds, go to step 2, else exit.
2) CT uses its session key SKCT,MUi (shared withMUi)
to decrypt the encrypted user message.
3) CT uses received timestamp TSui and parameter
TSui ⊕RNui to retrieve the random number as
RN ′ui = TSui ⊕RNui ⊕TSui .
4) CT computes hash value H3 = H(IDi|| F||
qfui ||RN ′ui). If the computed H3 and the received
hash value does not match, then CT rejects the request
immediately. Otherwise, go to step 5.
5) CT logs in to the server LSSNSj and creates a shared
session key SKCT,Sj , as explained in subsection V-C.
6) Through a public channel,CT forwards {ESKCT,Sj (IDi
||F|| qfui ||TSct ⊕ RNnewct ), H(IDi|| F|| qfui ||
RNnewct ), TSct} to LSSNSj .
Step FLQ3:
1) LSSNSj receives the message from CT and decrypts
the message using its session key SKSj ,CT (shared
with CT ).
2) LSSNSj checks the communication delay using cur-
rent timestamp TS∗ct and the received timestamp TSct.
if verification holds, go to step 3, else terminate the
session and exit.
3) LSSNSj retrieves RNnewct and computes fresh hash
value with the decrypted parameter and compares with
the received hash value.
4) If verification holds, go to step FLQ4, else terminate
the session and exit.
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1) LSSNSj finds the set Θ containing a database entry
for all friends of MUi.
2) LSSNSj finds whether δ((xp, yp), (xuit , yuit )) ≤
min(qfui , dfs)s∈Θ, p = 1, · · · , k, and t = 1, · · · , k,
where δ(·) is the distance function and (xuit , yuit )
are one real and k − 1 fake locations of MUi. Here,
database entry of IDi is excluded.
3) For all friends α ∈ Θ, LSSNSj includes record
(α, (p, enc∗p), Indexα) in the result set if the coordi-
nate (xαit , yαit ) meets the distance requirement.
4) Corresponding to k coordinate entries of MUi
(xui , yui)i=1···k, LSSNSj prepares k subsets
{Fi}i=1···k and adds them to result set.
5) LSSNSj uses RNnewct (the random number sent by
CT ), TSSj (the current timestamp) and encrypts the
result set using the shared session key SKSj ,CT .
6) Through public channel, LSSNSj forwards mes-
sage 〈ESKSj,CT ({Fi}i=1···k, Indexui , RN
new
ct ),
H(({Fi}i=1···k)|| RNnewct || TSSj ), TSSj 〉 to CT .
Step FLQ5:
1) CT receives the encrypted result set from LSSNSj .
2) CT decrypts it using own shared session key SKCT,Sj
to obtain {Fi}i=1···k, Indexui , and RNnewct .
3) CT verifies transmission delay by comparing the
current timestamp TS∗Sj and the received timestamp
TSSj .
4) CT verifies the value of received RNnewct with stored
RNnewct .
5) If both verification of step 3 and 4 is successful, then
go to step FLQ6, else exit.
Step FLQ6:
1) CT decrypts Indexui as DXΓ(Indexui) = DXΓ
(EXΓ(Seq(xui || yui || EKMUi,F (xui , yui)))) and re-
trieves the real sequence number γ. CT uses its master
secret key for the decryption.
2) CT discurds all records {Fi}i6=γ and accepts only Fγ .
3) CT finds every present user U in the dataset Fγ .
4) CT decrypts IndexU and finds its real center point
location γU .
5) CT retrieves encγU = EKMUi,F (xU , yU ) and prepares
answer setR.
6) CT sends the friend set R = ({IDUi , EKMUi,F (xU ,
yU )}i=1...k′) to MUi.
Remark 3. The existing location sharing schemes for OSN
suffer from multiple security drawbacks. The purpose of
our research is to design a secure and efficient location
sharing scheme for OSN. User location updates and friend’s
location queries are two essential operations for location
sharing services. As mentioned in existing location sharing
schemes [28], [29], [34], group key-establishment among a
user and its trusted social friends is an intrinsic require-
ments. In the literature, several group key distribution and
key-establishment schemes among social friends have been
proposed in distributed online social networks [51], [52],
[53], [54].
Unlike those schemes, our proposed one is not designed
for purpose group key distribution and key-establishment
among social friends. That said, the key-establishment pro-
cess among social friends advocated by Y. Jung et al. [51]
and L. Guo et al. [54] can be adapted to work with our
proposed scheme.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide the detail security analysis of
the proposed scheme. This is done in two ways. First,
we present the authentication proof Using Burrows-Abadi-
Needham (BAN) logic. Second, we present an informal secu-
rity analysis to logically explain how and why the proposed
scheme resists various security attacks.
A. AUTHENTICATION PROOF USING BAN LOGIC
BAN logic is used to analyze the security of any authen-
tication scheme to verify the secure transmission between
two communicating parties of that network [55]. In this
section, we use BAN logic to show that the proposed scheme
actually achieves the authentication goals. The basic syntax
and semantics of BAN logic are explained in Table 2.
TABLE 2: Notations and their descriptions used in BAN logic
Symbol Description
Q |≡ S Q believes that the statement S is true
Q C S Q can see the statement S
#(S) Formula S is considered as fresh
Q |v S Q said the statement S once
Q⇒ S Q keeps jurisdiction over the statement S
〈S〉T Formula S is combined with the formula T
Q
K←→ R Only Q and R know the value of the key K and




 R Only Q and R know the secret statement S.
Principals trusted by Q & R may know S
SK Current session key
The main logical postulates of the BAN logic are defined by
a set of laws or rules as listed below [55], [56].






• Law 2 (Nonce Verification Law (NVL)).
Q|≡#(S),Q|≡R|vS
Q|≡R|≡S .
• Law 3 (Freshness Conjuncatenation Law (FCL)).
Q|≡#(S)
Q|≡#(S,T ) .
• Law 4 (Jurisdiction Law (JL)).
Q|≡R⇒S,Q|≡R|≡S
Q|≡S .
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In order to show that the proposed scheme ensures authen-
tication, two goals, as mentioned in the following, must be
achieved.
Goal 1. MUi |≡ (MUi
SK←→ CT ).
Goal 2. CT |≡ (MUi
SK←→ CT ).
In the proposed scheme, there will be two basic types of
messages as follows:
Message 1. MUi → CT : { TID∗i , H(H(IDi ⊕
xCTui ||xΓ)) ⊕Ωui⊕ Tui ⊕H(IDCT ), Tui , H1}.
Message 2. CT →MUi: {BCTUi⊕ Ωct⊕ Tct⊕ IDi, Tct,
H3}.
The above generic messages have to be converted to ideal-
ized messages. These idealized messages are as follows.
Message 1. MUi → CT : {TIDi, Tui , 〈IDi, xCTUi , Ωui ,
Tui , H(IDCT )〉xΓ, H1}.
Message 2. CT → A : {Tct, 〈Ωct Tct, IDi, 〉xΓ, H3}.
With the following assumptions, the authentication proof
of our proposed scheme is presented as follows:
A.1: MUi |≡ #(Tct);
A.2: CT |≡ #(Tui);








A.5: MUi |≡ CT ⇒ (IDct,Ωct, Tct);
A.6: CT |≡MUi ⇒ (IDi, Ωui , Tui);
A.7: MUi |≡ Tui ;
A.8: MUi |≡ Ωui ;
A.9: MUi |≡ IDi;
A.10: MUi |≡ IDCT ;
A.11: CT |≡ Tct;
A.12: CT |≡ Ωct;
A.13: CT |≡ IDCT .
Next, we shall show that two goals mentioned earlier can
be achieved using the assumptions, idealized messages and
Basic BAN logic laws.
From the first message, we may obtain the following.
• S1: CT C {IDi, Tui , 〈IDi, xCTui , Ωui , Tui ,
H(IDCT )〉xΓ, H1}.
• S2: Using AL, we derive: CT C 〈IDi, xCTui , Ωui ,
Tui , H(IDCT )〉xΓ.
• S3: According to A.4 and MML, we obtain, CT |≡
MUi |v (IDi, xCTui , Ωui , Tui , H(IDCT )).
• S4: According to A.2 and FCL, we get, CT |≡ #(IDi,
xCTui , Ωui , Tui , H(IDCT )).
• S5: According to NVL, we have,CT |≡MUi |≡ (IDi,
xCTui , Ωui , Tui , H(IDCT )).
• S6: Using A.6 and JL, we get, CT |≡ (IDi, xCTui ,
Ωui , Tui , H(IDCT )).
• S7: From S6 and AL, we obtain, CT |≡ Ωui , CT |≡
Tui , CT |≡ IDi.
• S8: According to A.11, A.12, A.13, we get, CT |≡
IDCT , CT |≡ Tct and CT |≡ Ωct.
• S9: Since SKCT,MUi = H(IDi ||IDCT ||BCTui ||
P1||Ωct ||Tui ||Tct) and the results in Steps S7 and S8
give CT |≡ (MUi
SKCT,MUi←→ CT ). (Goal 2)
• S10: Using the message 2 and AL, we obtain, MUi C 〈
Ωct, Tct〉xΓ .
• S11: According to A.3 and MML, we get, MUi |≡
CT |v (Ωct, Tct).
• S12: Using A.1 and FCL, we obtain, MUi |≡ #(Ωct,
Tct).
• S13: Using NVL, we obtain, MUi |≡ CT |≡ (Ωct,
Tct).
• S14: A.5 and JL give MUi |≡ (Ωct, Tct).
• S15: According to S14 and AL, we have, MUi |≡ Ωct,
MUi |≡ Tct.
• S16: According to A.7-A.10, we obtain, MUi |≡ IDi,
MUi |≡ IDCT , MUi |≡ Tui , MUi |≡ Ωct.
• S17: The results of Steps S15 and S16 give MUi |≡
(MUi
SKCT,MUi←→ CT ). (Goal 1)
Consequently, both the goals are achieved to ensure that
mutual authentication between MUi and CT is established.
B. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present an informal analysis of the security
of the proposed scheme. This analysis aims to logically show
that our scheme can successfully defend against the following
known attacks.
1) The Replay Attack
In the proposed scheme, two message communications are
needed by the login phase and the authentication phase. In the
process of login,MUi sendsMsg1 = {TID∗i ,M1, H1, Tui}
to CT , whereas in authentication phase, CT sends Msg2
= {M2, H3, Tct} to MUi. CT does not accept Msg1 if
|T ∗ui − Tui | ≥ 4T . Additionally, CT computes H2 =
H(IDi ||M1 ||P1 ||Tui) and checks whether H2=H1 or
not. This computation is crucial to prevent a replay attack.
The cellular tower CT rejects any request for log-in if this
checking does not succeed. We have explained in StepLA5
in Section V-B, of the mOSN user login, authentication and
key establishment phase how an attacker cannot succeed in
replaying the authentication message Msg2. Moreover, CT
also stores parameters 〈IDi,Ωui , Tui〉 in its repository. In
case CT receives another login request message, say Msgn1
= {TID∗n,Mn1 , Hn1 , Tun}, it first checks whether Tun is
valid or not. If it is found to be valid, CT gies on to check
whether the extracted TID∗n = TIDn⊕ H(IDCT ||Tun) is
the same as the TIDn stored in its repository for the same
IDn. If they are the same,Msgn1 is considered being a replay
message. Thus, our proposed scheme is capable of resisting
a strong replay attack with the help of current timestamp and
a random nonce.
2) The Man-in-the-Middle Attack
An adversary A may attempt to modify login or authentica-
tion message through a man-in-the-middle attack. In order
to execute this attack, A set up an independent parallel con-
nection with both MUi and CT for a specific session. Addi-
tionally, to invalidate the login request of an authorized user,
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the attacker may modify some parameters from the request
message. In the proposed scheme, the credentials of both
login and authentication message, such as IDCT , RIDΓ,
AUiCT , etc. are generated with fuzzy extractor, hash function,
bitwise XOR and random nonce. This makes adversary A
very difficult to regenerate and modify. As a consequence,
the proposed scheme can resist the man-in-the-middle attack.
3) The Stolen/lost Mobile Device Attack
Suppose the mobile device of the user MUi has been stolen
or lost, an adversary can easily find P 1i and P
2
i , which are
stored in the memory of the device. However, IDi, PWi,
and biometric ηi are not stored directly in the device. From
stored P 1i = H(PWi|| ηi) ⊕n and P 2i = H(IDi ||PWi ||ηi
||n), it is computationally infeasible to identify or predict all
these parameters. Furthermore, P 1i and P
2
i are masked with
a random number n and the collision-resistant hash function
H(·). This makes it a computationally infeasible problem to
predict all the credentials in polynomial time. Therefore, the
proposed scheme resists this type of attacks.
4) The Offline Password Guessing Attack
As describe in Section V-B, a mobile user MUi needs the
identity IDi and password PWi for its login. An adversary
can obtain the P 1i and P
2
i from the lost or stolen mo-
bile device, but it cannot guess and compute identity IDi,
password PWi, and biometric ηi at the same time as it is
computationally infeasible. Hence, this scheme can prevent
the offline password guessing attack.
5) Known Key Secrecy/Forward Secrecy
An adversary may obtain the current session key, but with
that compromised session key, it cannot compute previous
session keys. As per the proposed scheme, the session key is
computed as SKCT,MUi = SKMUi,CT = H(IDi ||IDCT
||BCTUi ||P1 ||Ωct ||Tui ||Tct) where AUiCT = BCTUi =
H(H(IDi ⊕xCTUi ) ||XΓ). With the use of Ωi, Tui , Ωj ,
and Tuj , a new login key for each session, SKCT,MUi =
SKMUi,CT is generated freshly and uniquely. So, the key
cannot be used further in future. Moreover, before establish-
ing a session key, bothMUi and CT mutually validated each
other. Hence, the proposed scheme confirms that the leakage
of temporal information does not break the secrecy of the
session key and it provides the session key security.
6) User Anonymity
In this proposed scheme, the anonymity property of any
mobile user is maintained. An adversary may eavesdrop
a login or authentication message communicated between
MUi andCT , but adversary cannot get the original IDi from
those messages. At the time of login MUi send Msg1 =
{TID∗i ,M1, H1, Tui} to cellular tower CT . Instead of its
original identity MUi send its temporary identity TIDi
embedded in TID∗i = TIDi⊕ H(IDCT || Tui), which is
valid for only one session. Furthermore, it is not possible to
compute IDi fromM1 = AUiCT⊕ Ωui⊕ Tui⊕ H(IDCT )
and H1 = H(IDi|| M1|| Ωui || Tui). At the time of au-
thentication, CT transmits back a authentication response
message Msg2 = {M2, H3, Tct} to MUi where M2 =
BCTUi⊕ Ωct⊕ Tct⊕ IDi and H3 = H(IDi ||P1 ||Ωct ||Tui
||Tct ||SKCT,MUi). So, from any intrude message, it is not
feasible to figure out the original IDi by an adversary. Thus,
the proposed scheme can preserve the anonymity property of
any user.
7) The Parallel Session and Reflection Attack
In the proposed scheme, an adversary cannot start a new
session with CT using any fake identity, obtaining from any
eavesdropped messages Msg1 = {TID∗i ,M1, H1, Tui}. As
described in section V-B, an adversary cannot obtain the
correct identity IDi, password PWi or the biometric key
ηi of any legal user MUi with an offline password guessing
attack. Hence, from any eavesdropped message, an attacker
cannot create a valid login request message Msg1, so a
new session with CT as a legal user not possible. Thus,
our proposed scheme can protect the parallel session and
reflection attacks.
8) Session Key Security
For establishing a new session, a mutually computed session
key SKMUi,CT (= SKCT,MUi) is shared betweenMUi and
CT . The session key is computed as follows:
SKCT,MUi
= H(IDi||IDCT ||BCTUi ||P1||Ωct||Tui ||Tct)
= H(IDi||IDCT ||AUiCT ||P1||Ωct||Tui ||Tct)
= H(IDi||IDCT ||AUiCT ||Ωui ||Ωct||Tui ||Tct)
= H(IDi||IDCT ||AUiCT ||Ωui ||P2||Tui ||Tct)
= SKMUi,CT
Both MUi and CT authenticate each other to compute the
mutually shared session key. Moreover, an adversary needs
the credentials IDi, IDCT , BCTUi = (AUiCT ) for comput-
ing session keys. Therefore, the session keys are fully secured
in our proposed scheme.
9) The Ephemeral Secret Leakage Attack
An adversary may obtain the temporary (ephemeral) secrets
(e.g., random variable) of any session from a compromised
mobile device if those are not deleted properly. In this kind
of attacks, with the mentioned information, an attacker can
initiate an ephemeral secret leakage attack. As per our pro-
posed scheme, our session key is generated as follows:
SKMUi,CT = H(IDi ||IDCT ||AUiCT ||Ωui ||P2 ||Tui
||Tct) where AUiCT = V ′CTUi⊕ (H(IDi|| H(PWi|| n
′
||ηi))). Ωui is a 128-bit random number there. With this
single random number, an attacker cannot regenerate the
session key SKMUi,CT , as it requires some other credentials,
such as IDi, IDCT , PWi etc. Thus, our scheme can defend
the ephemeral secret leakage attack.
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FIGURE 11: Code for channel declarations, keys, constants, func-
tions, equations, queries and events
FIGURE 12: Code in ProVerif for the process of MUi, the ith
mobile user
10) The User Impersonation Attack
In the user impersonation attack, an adversary pretends itself
as an authorized user to the cellular tower. So, for login, an
adversary needs the credentials value of IDi, PWi, B′i. As
it is already discussed that in our proposed scheme, these
credentials are not sent directly through the public channel
or saved in the device memory, or it is computationally
infeasible to obtain them from the easily available informa-
tion. If an adversary wants to send a login message Msg1
= {TID∗i ,M1, H1, Tui} to CT , it needs to compute TID∗i
(= TIDi⊕ H(IDCT || Tui) and M1 = AUiCT⊕ Ωui⊕
Tui⊕ H(IDCT ). After receiving the login request, with the
help of timestamp value Tui and the random variable AUiCT ,
CT can determine if the received message Msg1 is original
or replayed. Therefore, with invalid IDi, PWi, and B′i, it is
not possible to generate or modifyMsg1. Thus, our proposed
scheme can defend the user impersonation attack.
11) The Server Impersonation Attack
In the server impersonation attack, an attacker may pretend
itself as a genuine server. In our proposed scheme, after
receiving valid login request message, a cellular tower CT
replies back with an authorization message Msg2 = {M2,
H3, Tct} to MUi. For calculating M2(= BCTUi⊕ Ωct⊕
Tct⊕ IDi) and hash value H3(= H(IDi ||P1 ||Ωct ||Tui
||Tct ||SKCT,MUi)), an attacker needs the secret key, XΓ of
the cellular tower and the random number xCTUi asBCTUi =
H(H(IDi ⊕xCTUi ) ||XΓ). Hence, our proposed scheme can
resist the server impersonation attack.
12) The Privileged-insider Attack
This kind of attacks is launched by an internal user who may
be authorized to use the system that is attacked. Suppose
that an adversary, who is an internal user also, obtains the
registration credentials IDi, (MPWBi⊕λ) from the mobile
registration request Msg1. However, as discussed in section
V-B, it is not feasible to compute the PWi and the biometric
key ηi = even if the adversary has that lost or stolen mobile
device. Without the knowledge of λ, it also not possible to
calculate MPWBi from (MPWBi ⊕ λ). So, our scheme
can resist this type of attacks.
FIGURE 13: Code in ProVerif for the process of CT
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FIGURE 14: Results of the ProVerif simulation and their analysis
VII. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION USING
PROVERIF
In this section, we present the formal security verification of
the proposed scheme using based ProVerif simulation tool
[57]. This tool is based on applied pi calculus and can be
used to verify whether an attacker can attack the session key
[48]. We have modelled the proposed scheme in ProVerif
and corresponding the source codes have been presented in
Figure 11, Figure 12, Figure 13, and Figure 14.
In Figure 11, the code for channel declarations is pre-
sented along with the definition of constants, free vari-
ables,functions, equations, queries and events, which are
needed to model the proposed scheme. Figure 12 depicts
the ProVerif code for mobile user MU registration, login,
authentication and key-establishment process with CT . Cel-
lular tower registration process (CTReg) and authentication
process (CTAuth) have been presented as a parallel composi-
tion in Figure 13.
Finally, we execute the codes given in the previous three
Figures in the latest version (1.93) of ProVerif simulation
tool. The results of session key secrecy (from the user as well
as cellular tower) and authentication are presented in Figure
14. The following observations can be drawn from the results.
• RESULT inj-event (UserAuth(id)) ==> inj-event
(UserStart(id)) is true.
• RESULT not attacker(SKmuct[]) is true.
• RESULT not attacker(SKctmu[]) is true.
From the result set mentioned above, we conclude that the
proposed scheme passes the required security verification.
VIII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the computation and communi-
cation cost of our proposed scheme. It is to be noted that
the proposed scheme avoids cryptographic operations such as
bilinear pairing, elliptic curve point multiplication operation
etc., as they incur high computation overhead.
A. COMPUTATION COST ANALYSIS
Table 5 shows various cryptographic operations, correspond-
ing notations and their execution time on an Intel Pentium4
2600 MHz processor with 1024 MB RAM, as performed in
[63], [39]. Due to the fuzzy extractor Rep(·) function for
extracting the biometric key αi, we require TFE ≈ TM [64].
Symmetric encryption/decryption has been given for a AES-
128 symmetric cryptosystem. The mobile user registration
and LSSNS Registration mechanism is a one-time process.
As a result, we have not considered the computation cost
of the registration phases. In Table 3 we have tabulated the
computational overhead for the main three entities of our
scheme MUi, CT and LSSNSj . For MUi, during login
phase overhead is 10*TH + 10*TX + TFE . Since bitwise
XOR operation, TX time is negligible, the overhead will be
10 ∗ TH + TFE . For the authentication, required overhead
of CT will be 7 ∗ TH + 8 ∗ TX ≈ 7 ∗ TH . Hence, overall
computation cost of mobile user login and authentication
phase is 17 ∗ TH + TFE = 17 ∗ 0.5 + 1 ∗ 63.08 = 71.58ms.
Following the same procedure, we calculate the computation
cost and the exact execution time of all other remaining
phases of the proposed scheme and tabulate them in Table
3.
B. COMMUNICATION COST ANALYSIS
In order to calculate the overall communication overhead of
our proposed scheme, we have assumed standard bit sizes of
various parameters and cryptographic function outputs. As
an example, the bit size of used identity, random numbers
and timestamp are 160, 128 and 32 bits respectively. The
size of output of hash function H(·) is 160 bits, (if we use
SHA-1 hash function [65]) and output of symmetric encryp-
tion/decryption (for example, Advanced Encryption Standard
or AES-128 [66]) is 128 bits and the prime number is 160
bits. For mobile user login and authentication in our pro-
posed scheme, two message communications are required.
In step ULA2 of Section V-B, CT receives the login request
message from mobile user MUi. In step ULA4, CT sends
one authentication response message to the MUi. The com-
munication cost for transmission of the MUi login message
{TID∗i ,M1, H1, Tui} requires (160+160+160+32)=512
bits and authentication response message {M2, H3, Tct}
requires (160 + 160 + 32)= 352 bits. In the same fashion, we
calculate the communication cost of messages communicated
in various other phases of the proposed scheme. Table 4
shows the detailed communication cost for different phases.
C. STORAGE OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
We have three different entities in our scheme - mobile de-
vice (MUi), cellular tower(CT ) and location sharing social
network server(LSSNSj). We have calculated the storage
requirement for each of them separately. The lengths of some
important parameters that are needed to calculate the storage
space are as follows:
Device identity or serial number :: 160 bit
Output of a secured one way hash function H(·) :: 160 bit
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TABLE 3: Computation cost of the proposed scheme
Phase/Entity Mobile User Cellular Tower Location Server Total execution
(MUi) (CT ) (LSSNSj) time (in ms)
Mobile User Login
and Authentication
10*TH + 10*TX + TFE – – 71.58– 7*TH + 8*TX –
Location Server Login
and Authentication
– – 7*TH + 8*TX + TCH 45.54– 6*TX + TCH –
Distance Threshold Registration TH + 2*Tsym 2*TH + 4*Tsym 2*Tsym 71.10
User Location Update TH + 2*Tsym 2*TH + 4*Tsym 2*Tsym 72.10
Friends’ Location Query TH + 2*Tsym 3*TH + 4*Tsym 2*TH + 2*Tsym 72.6
TABLE 4: Communication cost of the proposed scheme
Phase Entity Communicated message Size (bits)
ULA MUi side {TID
∗
i ,M1, H1, Tui} 512
CT side {M2, H3, Tct} 352
SLA LSSNSj side {PIDSj , Tsj (C),R1, MSj , TSj} 640
CT side {R4,MCT , TCT } 352
DTR
MUi side 〈ESKMUi,CT (IDi|| Dfui || RNui || TSui || Rflag = 1), H(IDi|| RNui || TSui), TSui〉 320
CT to LSSNSj 〈ESKCT,Sj (IDi|| Dfui || RNui || RNct|| TSct|| Rflag = 1), H(IDi|| RNct|| TSct), TSct〉 320
CT to MUi ESKCT,MUi (IDi||RNui ||‘ok
′) 128
LSSNSj side 〈ESKCT,Sj (IDi||RNui ||RNct||‘ok
′)〉 128
ULU
MUi side 〈ESKMUi,CT (IDi||xui ||yui ||EKMUi,F (xui , yui)||RNui ||TSui), H1〉 288
CT to LSSNSj {IDSj , ESKCT,Sj (Msg2|| RNct|| TSct), H(LSSNSj ||Msg2|| RNct), TSct} 480
CT to MUi ESKCT,MUi (‘ok
′) 128
LSSNSj side ESKSj,CT (IDi||LSSNSj ||RNct||‘ok
′) 128
FLQ
MUi side {ESKMUi,CT (IDi|| F|| qfui ||TSui ⊕RNui), H(IDi|| F|| qfui ||RNui), TSui} 320
CT to LSSNSj {ESKCT,Sj (IDi|| F|| qfui ||TSct ⊕RN
new
ct ), H(IDi|| F|| qfui ||RNnewct ), TSct} 320
CT to MUi ({IDUi , EKMUi,F (xU , yU )}i=1...k′) 288
LSSNSj side 〈ESKSj,CT ({Fi}i=1···k, Indexui , RN
new
ct ), H(({Fi}i=1·k)|| RNnewct || TSSj ), TSSj 〉 320
ULA: Mobile user login and authentication phase; SLA: Location server login and authentication phase;
DTR: Distance threshold registration phase; ULU: User location update phase; FLQ: Friends’ Location Query;
TABLE 5: Various notations used and their time complexity
Symbol Description Execution time
(in milliseconds)
TH One-way hash function 0.50
Tsym symmetric key 8.70
encryption/decryption
TM Elliptic curve 63.08
point multiplication
TCH Chebyshev map operation 21.02
TFE Fuzzy extractor operation ≈ TM
Session key :: 160 bit
One random number, r :: 128 bit
Master secret key, XΓ:: 1024-bit
Secret key, xCTUi :: 1024-bit
Fuzzy Extractor, µi :: 128 bit
According to our proposed scheme, a mobile device MUi






SKMUi,CT . Hence, the required storage space of MUi is =
128 + 160 + 160 + 160 + 160 + 160 +160 = 1088 bit. A
cellular tower, CT , needs minimum { XΓ + IDCT + IDi +
TIDi + xCTUi + IDSj + SNj + r + SKCT,MUi + SKCT,Sj )
= 1024 +160 + 160+ 160+ 1024+ 160+ 160 + 128+160 +
160} = 3296 bit storage space to complete its processing.
LSSNSj requires {E1 + TXΓ(Kj) +E2 + fSj + SKSj ,CT }
= 160 +160+ 160 +160 +160 = 800 bit. Table 7 shows the
storage analysis of our proposed scheme.
IX. PERFORMANCE AND COMPARATIVE STUDY
In this section, we present a comparative study of our pro-
posed scheme with some recent chaotic-map based user
authentication schemes under multi-server environment, such
as schemes proposed by C. C. Lee et al. [58], X. Li et al. [59],
Tsai-Lo [60], Irshad et al. [61] and H. Wang et al. [62]. The
comparative study includes detail analysis and comparison
in terms of security and functionality features, computation
overheads and communication overheads.
In Table 6, we have tabulated an overall security and func-
tionality features comparison among our proposed scheme
and other related authentication and key-establishment
schemes. It is seen that a large number of the recent schemes
do not support three-factor authentication, as they do not
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TABLE 6: Security and functionality comparison
Security attribute C. C. Lee et al. X. Li et al. Tsai-Lo Irshad et al. H. Wang et al. Our
/Scheme [58] [59] [60] [61] [62]
Stolen smart card attack X X X X X X
Supports three-factor authentication X X X X X X
Off-line password guessing attack X X X X X X
On-line password guessing attack X X X X X X
Strong replay attack X X X X X X
Privileged insider attack X X X X X X
User impersonation attack X X X X X X
Server impersonation attack X X X X X X
Denial of service attack X X X X X X
Known session key secrecy X X X X X X
User anonymity provision X X X X X X
Forward secrecy X X X X X X
Session key security X X X X X X
Session key recovery attack X X X X X X
Login phase efficiency X X X X X X
Mutual authentication X X X X X X
Supports Location-Sharing X X X X X X
Supports Friends’ Locations Query X X X X X X
Formal security analysis X X X X X X
Simulation using AVISPA/ProVerif X X X X X X
Note: X: does not support a particular feature;X: supports a particular feature.
TABLE 7: Storage analysis of the proposed scheme.
Entity Parameters Total size





, RIDi, 1088 bit
RID′Γ, SKMUi,CT
CT XΓ, IDCT , IDi, TIDi, xCTUi , 3296 bit
IDSj , SNj , r, SKCT,MUi , SKCT,Sj )
LSSNSj E1, TXΓ(Kj), E2, fSj , SKSj ,CT 800 bit
TABLE 8: Comparison of communication costs
Scheme Communication rounds No. of bits
C. C. Lee et al. [58] 3 1088
X. Li et al. [59] 5 2592
Tsai-Lo [60] 5 2560
Irshad et al. [61] 5 3072
H. Wang et al. [62] 5 3200
Our 4 1856
include user biometrics [43]. The tabulation result reveals
that the existing schemes suffer from various security attacks
like stolen smart card attack [60], [61], server impersonation
attack [58], session key recovery attack [61] and login phase
inefficiency [58]. Moreover, it is observed that these chaotic-
map based authentication schemes can not support proper
location-sharing and friends’ locations query feature. It is
clear from Table 6 that the proposed scheme overcomes
such security and functionality weaknesses of the existing
schemes.
In Table 9, we tabulate and compare the computation
overheads of the proposed scheme with the relevant schemes
[58], [59], [60], [61], [62]. The mobile user registration phase
and the location sharing social network server registration
phase are an one-time process only. Hence, for calculation as
well as comparison of communication cost, we consider only
user and server login, authentication and key-establishment
phases for the proposed and related schemes. Table 5 shows
various cryptographic operations, corresponding notations
and their execution time on an Intel Pentium4 2600 MHz
processor with 1024 MB RAM, as performed in [63], [39].
For all the given schemes, we separately tabulated compu-
tation for the user, server and the registration center or the
cellular tower. Also, in Table 9, we mention and compare
total computation cost for each relevant scheme.
It is observed that total computation cost of our proposed
scheme is ≈ 117.122 ms only, whereas computation cost of
C. C. Lee et al.’s scheme [58] is ≈ 131.62 ms, X. Li et
al.’s scheme [59] is ≈ 135.62 ms, Tsai-Lo’s scheme [60]
is ≈ 95.58 ms, Irshad et al.’s scheme [61] is ≈ 140.62
ms and H. Wang et al.’s scheme [62] is ≈ 178.04 ms.
It is to be noted that, except Tsai-Lo’s scheme, we have
the lowest computation cost. The reason behind such low
computation cost of our proposed schemes is that, we use
only two chaotic map operations for authentication and key-
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TABLE 9: Comparison of computational costs among related schemes.
Phase Entity C. C. Lee et al. X. Li et al. Tsai-Lo Irshad et al. H. Wang et al. Our
[58] [59] [60] [61] [62]
Mobile 5TH + 3TCH 7TH + 3TCH 8TH + 2TCH 11TH + 3TCH 11TH + 2TCH 10TH + TFE
Mobile user user ≈ 65.56 ms ≈ 66.56 ms ≈ 46.04 ms ≈ 68.56 ms ≈ 47.54 ms ≈ 68.08 ms
and server Server 6TH + 3TCH 4TH + 2TCH 5TH + 2TCH 7TH + 2TCH 8TH + 2TCH 7TH + TCH
login & ≈ 66.06 ms ≈ 44.04 ms ≈ 44.54 ms ≈ 45.54 ms ≈ 46.04 ms ≈ 24.52 ms
authentication RC or 8TH + TCH 10TH 11TH + TCH 8TH + 3TCH 14TH + TCH
phase CT − ≈ 25.02 ms ≈ 5 ms ≈ 26.52 ms +2TSym ≈ 24.52 ms
≈ 84.46 ms
Total computation cost ≈ 131.62 ms ≈ 135.62 ms ≈ 95.58 ms ≈ 140.62 ms ≈ 178.04 ms ≈ 117.122 ms
establishment purpose, which is the minimum among other
related existing schemes.
Table 8 shows and compares message communication
rounds and communication cost (in bits) of the proposed
scheme with related schemes [58], [59], [60], [61], [62].
Since the user and server registration phasesare executed only
once, we consider only user and server login, authentication
& key-establishment phases for calculation of communica-
tion cost for the proposed scheme and other schemes. In our
proposed scheme, mOSN user and location server login and
authentication phase needs 864 bits and 992 bits of message
communication respectively, with a total communication cost
of 1856 bits. From Table 8, it is clear that, compared to
all related scheme, except C. C. Lee et al.’s scheme [58],
the proposed scheme has the minimum communication cost.
Unfortunately, as shown in Table 6, C. C. Lee et al.’s scheme
is vulnerable to some serious security attacks. Overall, the
proposed scheme is both efficient and provides much greater
security and functionality features for the smart devices as
compared to all existing compared schemes.
X. CONCLUSION
This paper presents an efficient location sharing scheme
for mOSNs and shows the ability to resist various active
and passive security attacks that are present in the existing
schemes. The proposed scheme integrates LBS and SNS into
a set of single entity servers, thereby reducing their internal
communication overhead. Our location sharing scheme for
mOSNs shows both efficiency and flexibility in location up-
date, sharing, and query of social friends and social strangers.
Formal security verification, authentication proof and sim-
ulation results prove the security strength of the proposed
scheme.
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